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Recent financial scandals have provoked the loss of confidence in the financial 
information, forcing changes in the audit legislation. In this sense, one of the most 
important aspects to improve the audit quality is the auditor’s independence, a key 
point regarding the trust in the audited financial information. For this reason, it has 
been a very discussed and controversial issue; however, the alternative solution of 
establishing an effective system of sanctions for auditor’s independence infringements 
has never been analysed. A proper regulation of influential features and an appropriate 
degree of control and disciplinary activity could control the auditor’s independence and, 
in turn, it could increase the financial information credibility. The current law has 
improved those aspects, especially in the field of EIP, but, further studies are needed to 
clarify its effectiveness by monitoring all infringements and sanctions. 
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1. Introduction  
In Spain, the audit is regulated since 1988 and that legislation has undergone 
several modifications and renovations during the years until the last audit law Act-
22/2015 which entered into force a few days ago. This rule respond to the need to 
adapt the previous legislation to the new European regulations, motivated by several 
financial scandals that have occurred in recent times, in which auditors were accused 
to be responsible for not detecting fraud and it has discredited their work. The audit is 
considered as a public interest activity because the financial information published by 
audited companies is necessary for the proper functioning of the market. To make this 
possible, it is necessary that third parties trust in the quality of disclosed information is 
there where the auditor plays an indispensable role by verifying the financial 
information provided, enhancing its reliability and quality. To meet these goals, auditor 
independence is one of the main values to be preserved, so different safeguards are 
needed. 
Rivers of ink has been written about auditor’s independence and variations on 
the theme, but there is no consensus on how to avoid the lack of independence and 
how to implement its effective control (Herrera, 2016). However, the crucial role of 
auditor’s independence in the improvement of the audit quality has been demonstrated, 
along with improving confidence in financial reporting (Gómiz, 2003).  The problem is 
originated by the difficulty of proving the auditor’s independence when suspicious 
arises in the market on the quality of service.  
Despite the great deal of effort devoted to study auditor’s independence, there 
are few studies that focus on the system of sanctions for specific infringements against 
independence as a mean to enhance auditor’s independence. For this reason, the 
purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of the infringements and sanctions system 
provided for the Audit Laws in enhancing audit independence.  
Consequently, it is based on the Spanish rules (Audit Acts) and the body 
responsible for controlling (ICAC), and some authors affirm that the best way to control 
auditor’s independence is through the regulation of several aspects such as: a) cases 
of incompatibilities, b) the mandatory rotation, c) the amounts of fees, as well as, d) the 
effective control which translates into rigorous implementation of the sanctions system. 
In this sense, the ICAC (as the body responsible for monitoring auditor’s 
independence) plays a key role to ensure independence. A study should be produced 
to figure out whether to extend its control is an effective way or not. In other words, to 
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verify how infringements and sanctions of the current legislation are, whether they are 
strongly or calmly enforced to improve auditor’s independence.  
This work contributes to the auditor’s independence literature with the provision 
of a different view about independence through the introduction of the infringements 
and penalties system. This is an innovative perspective on audit because offenses and 
sanctions system is not yet considered as interesting enough in enhancing the auditor’s 
independence.  
In order to achieve the mentioned targets, the analysis is divided into two 
blocks: first of all, the theoretical framework is presented and both the legislative history 
and the situation of the audit sector in Spain are analysed; and secondly, an analysis of 
the infringements and penalties system until today, pointing out the current situation of 
the sector and the infringements and penalties system, with the goal of discerning 
whether the legislative change will improve the status of audit quality and confidence in 
financial information in Spain or not. 
Regarding the legislative framework, a summary of legislative development has 
been devised in Spain, paying particular attention to the independence of the auditor 
and the system of infringements and sanctions as a key tool to control, as well as the 
analysis of the current sector situation as one of the reasons for changes in audit 
legislation. Comparing the new law with the previous, it can be seen that the new 
legislation guarantees the independence better than earlier for including new 
incompatibilities, increasing network auditor and incorporating a specific and restricted 
regulation for EIP in mandatory rotation and limit of fees. 
As for the review of the infringement and penalties system, this report has 
analysed several years (1992 until 2014) based on a literature review of some 
empirical works with the purpose of analysing whether the ICAC exercises an effective 
disciplinary and control activity, especially regarding independence, or whether the 
control is quite relaxed (which would jeopardize auditor’s independence). Different 
periods are analysed as the period before the legislative change, but it has depended 
on the legislation and the situation. This analysis has proved that violations related to 
the lack of independence are a matter of fundamental importance, as well as the 
effectiveness of the work of the ICAC in this field. However, it should be kept in mind 
that this research only examines and considers a few works of the sector; as a 
consequence, it has an insignificant volume.   
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Finally, the conclusions highlight once again the importance of the auditor’s 
independence in order to ensure audit quality, reliability and confidence of users on 
financial information. Even before the legislative change occurred, the ICAC monitored 
the lack of independence due to its importance in the markets; however, it is very 
difficult to prove the lack of independence, so the new legislation will provide new 
effective tools for fencing auditor independence. The question now is if this legislative 
change will be sufficient to ensure auditor independence, avoiding new financial 
scandals and, therefore, increasing discredit of auditors. Nevertheless, it is true that 
further studies are needed to clarify these points.  
2. Theoretical framework  
The audit of accounts is an activity carried out by independent professionals 
which guarantees to a certain company that its annual accounts will reflect a true and 
fair view of the equity, as well as its financial position and the income of the firm. In 
order to attribute credibility to the accounting information and encourage its use in 
decision-making, the rules require that an independent expert has to prepare 
periodically an audit of the financial statements of the company. The external auditor is 
the responsible of reviewing and checking the annual accounts in order to render an 
opinion whether the financial statements of a company are presented fairly, in 
accordance with the financial reporting framework. The auditor's report must be 
incorporated compulsorily the annual accounts and it is a useful tool for stakeholders 
who need a reliable and fair view of the firm’s financial information, especially for 
investors that should have an authoritative assessment about the level of 
implementation of the accounting principles, emphasizing the importance of trust 
among economic agents for reducing certain costs, and therefore for generating value 
(Gill de Albornoz & Illueca, 2006). If there is no trust between the parties involved in the 
financial transactions, it will be necessary to have 
credible sources of verification to ensure these 
transactions and then to reducing their costs, 
therefore, the credibility and objectivity of the auditors 
are essential for the well-functioning of the market. 
Nowadays, the users of financial information need to recover the confidence 
that has been called into question after the last scandals, especially from Enron Case. 
The confidence in audit guarantees trustworthy financial information that facilitates the 
proper operation of the market. The only way to obtain the confidence is by doing 
quality audit works. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that auditors have a high 
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level of professional competence and in turn, they should operate in an independent 
way. If auditors have an independent attitude, they will be able to report the detected 
mistakes. To sum up, independence increases the audit quality and the confidence in 
the financial information of companies (García & Jaramillo, 2014). In addition, the 
market efficiency depends on the trust that investors 
place in the system, closely related to the relevant, 
complete and accurate information that they can 
provide but, ultimately, all will depend on the existing 
degree of transparency. On the other hand, perhaps 
this role of "guarantor of reliability", the figure of the auditor, despite being a link in 
within the chain of information that integrates the financial system, it has acquired an 
active attitude towards the common goal of regaining lost confidence. The auditor is 
one of the most important components in the chain of financial information system; 
likewise, he has acquired an important role in regaining confidence for his figure such 
as "guarantor of reliability” (Gómiz, 2003). 
It follows from the above that the opinion of the auditor must be objective and 
reliable because it would be a senseless to trust with an audit report which is not 
entirely stable. But, is it possible to guarantee the auditor’s objectivity? The only way to 
not call into question the opinion of the auditor is by guaranteeing his independence. 
That is established in the European Commission Recommendation which says “the 
independence of auditors is essential for public confidence in the reliability of the 
reports they issue. It adds credibility to published financial information and value to 
investors, creditors, employees and other stakeholders of the EU companies, 
particularly in the case of public interest entities” (Comisión Europea, 2002). It is also 
common sense that the current legislation reflects this obvious fact, it ensures its 
enforcement and it controls and includes penalties for noncompliance.  
According to the Technical Standards Auditing (NTA), “the accounts auditor will 
support a position of absolute independence, integrity and objectivity during his 
professional action. The independence supposes a 
mental attitude that allows to the auditor to act with 
freedom with regard to his professional judgement, for 
which must be free of any predisposition that limits his 
impartiality in the objective consideration of the facts, as 
well as in the formulation of his conclusions. […] each 
and every of the functions that he has to realize have to 
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be presided by a professional irreproachable honesty (integrity) […] he will have to 
enjoy a total independence in his relations with the audited entity […] and the freedom 
of expressing his professional opinion” (Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de 
Cuentas, 1991). 
Once it has been checked the importance of trusting with accounting 
information of economic agents and the direct relationship between reliable information 
and auditor’s independence, it should be noted that if an appropriated control of 
independence through the system of infringements and penalties is applied, the 
independence of the auditor will be demonstrated and, in turn, the credibility and 
reliability of accounting information verified by the auditor will be guaranteed. It is 
important to remark that infringements and penalties system was included in the 
legislation since the first audit of accounts law was 
created in 1988 and it has been improved every act until 
the current law.  
This concept and its regulation have been developing over years until the 
current new Audit Law 22/2015 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2015) was issued. This law 
is applied since 17th June 2016, but consequently, the new infringements and sanction 
system have not been enforced yet. The paragraphs bellow try to describe the current 
situation of the audit sector, as well as the evolution of the audit legislation which is 
focused on the system of infractions and sanctions related to independence. The 
purpose is twofold:  to analyse briefly the audit situation in Spain and to offer a critical 
view of the control and the degree of auditor’s compliance with the independence 
requirements in order to guarantee the confidence in financial information. 
a. Audit Legal Framework in Spain until 2015 
According to the preamble of the new Spanish Financial Auditing Act-Law 
22/2015 of 20th July (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2015)   (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 
2015), the activity of account auditing was regulated for the first time by Act-Law 
19/1988, of 12th July (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1988), 
transposing the Eighth Directive 84/253/CEE now repealed. 
The law defines some key questions about financial audit 
such as auditor’s responsibilities and incompatibilities, the 
system of penalties and the controlling role on the part of the 
Institute of Accounting and Audit of Accounts (ICAC).  
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Since then, several norms have been developed one after the other until 
completing the penalty system over time as: Act 4/1990, of 29th June, on General 
Budgets of the State for 1990, Act 31/1991, of 30th December, on General Budgets of 
the State for 1992, Act 13/1992 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1992), of 1st June, on Own 
Resources and supervision in consolidated base of Financial Organizations, Act 
3/1994, of 14th April, Act 2/1995, of 23th March, on limited liability companies, Act 
37/1998, of 16th November, on the reform of Law 24/1988, 28th July, on the Stock 
market, Act 41/1999, of 12th November, on Systems of Payments and Liquidation of 
Values, and so on. 
It is important to remark two key reforms in audit legislation:  
1. The reform introduced by Act 44/2002, of 22th November, of Measures of 
Financial System Reform (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2002) and Law 
62/2003, of 30th December, upon which substantial amendments were 
introduced such as the requirement of independence for auditors, the 
causes of incompatibilities, the auditor rotation in relation to certain 
audited organizations, the system of penalties or the skills of the ICAC in 
regard to the control of the audit activity, among other questions. 
Concerning to the auditor rotation, this point has led to a great deal of 
controversy due to the lack of consensus about the optimal rotation. 
Subsequently, there were several amendments regarding the audit contract 
and rotation such as Act 16/2007, of 4th July, 
modified by Law 34/2007, of 15th November 
which allowed the renewal of the auditor’s 
contract for successive periods of up to three 
years once the initial contract had finished (4th 
final disposition Law 34/2007). 
2. The substantial reforms introduced by Audit Act-Law 12/2010 of 30th June 
that modified Act 19/1988, among others, to transpose the Directive 
2006/43/CE (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2010). This new standard entailed a 
turning point for the audit activity regulation, which would be now 
understood as an activity of “public interest”, it exists a group of people 
and institutions who rely on the work performed by the auditor of accounts, 
who helps to the correct operation from the markets and increases the 
integrity and the effectiveness of the financial statements information 
(Herrera, 2016). This law amended several aspects of the existing 
legislation, including the norms of professional ethics, independence and 
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objectivity, the auditor responsibility, the quality control of 
auditors and the effective systems of investigation and specific 
sanction, among others. It is important to emphasize the 
modification about the duty of independence, including the 
network concept, the scope of subjective extensions to include 
certain relatives, the obligation to publish an annual report of transparency, 
the rotation of the signer of an audit report and so on. 
A summary of the main Spanish laws and their amendments regarding audit 
activity is shown at Figure n.1.  
 
Figure 1: Main audit laws in Spain before Act 22/2015 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
In relation to the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2011, of 1st July (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 2011), it was approved the Consolidated Text of the Law of Audit of Accounts, 
a comprehensive text of the norm that is applicable to the activity of audit of accounts; 
it is systematic, harmonized and unified until the entry into force of the new law. 
b. New Challenges in the Audit profession, New Regulatory 
Changes. The new Financial Auditing Act-Law 22/2015  
According to the Act-Law 22/2015 Preamble, the financial crisis caused an 
issue on the European legal framework which was questioned and this fact drove some 
changes in the normative. As the main objective, the audit activity would have to 
contribute to the financial stability, in this way, the confidence of economic and financial 
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information would be reinforced and it would improve audit 
quality. As a result, the directive 2014/56/UE and 
Regulation (the EU) 537/2014 were issued. These 
European norms also try to increase the transparency, to 
strengthen the independence and objectivity of auditors 
and to invigorate and open the audit market, among other 
questions. As described previously, the objective of this legislation is twofold: firstly to 
recover the confidence of users in the economic and financial information that is 
audited, and secondly to reinforce the quality of audits by improving auditor’s 
independence. For this reason, the Act 22/2015 was issued to adapt the Spanish audit 
law to that European legislation with the possibility of including additional requirements 
through the technical audit regulations.  
The new Spanish law is structured in a Preliminary title and five titles; however, 
the present work focuses on the study of regulatory aspects related to auditor 
independence (Title I, Chapter II, 2nd Section) and those are related to the system of 
infringements and penalties (Title III). By comparing the previous laws and the current 
one this final project aims firstly to analyse if the new law of audit enhances the 
guarantees for auditor independence. The second objective 
is to evidence whether a control of the duty of keep 
independence was exercise or not through the empirical 
study of the infringements and penalties system. Finally, the 
third objective is to analyse the repercussion of the new law 
in the sanctions for lack of independence, and if the above 
mentioned law will be able to avoid more financial scandals 
related to the audit. 
The current vice-president in functions Soraya Sáez de Santa Maria ensured 
that the aim of the new audit law is "to reinforce the services of audit, to increase the 
quality and to strengthen the auditors’ independence" (Expansión.com, 2015). 
Furthermore, Luis de Guindos, Minister of Economy 
and Competitiveness, has also emphasised that the norm 
promotes the independence of the auditor. For this reason, 
there are included up to eleven incompatible services that 
auditors cannot carry out: e.g. accounting services, internal 
audit services, design of procedures for internal control or 
management of risks related to financial information, fiscal 
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services and valuation, among others. In addition, some relatives of the auditor also 
cannot supply the above-mentioned incompatible services. The following picture 
(Figure n.2) shows the significant differences between the new audit law and the 
previous one, according to expansion.com (2015): 
 
Figure 2: Legal developments Act 22/2015 
Source: Own Elaboration  
In keeping with the picture above, auditor’s independences could be enclosed 
by three dimensions: the proper regulation of the incompatibilities that includes non-
audit services, the auditor’s rotation regulation and an appropriate limit of fees. In 
support of this claim, the European Commission would like to reinforce the 
independence of auditors and avoid low levels of audit firm rotation or the provision of 
non-audit services by audit firms (European Commission, 2010) It is important to 
highlight that the new audit law includes some of these aspects but it is necessary to 
analyse if the changes would be on the right track. Along the same lines, Zubiaurre 
(2012) points out that it is considered the limit of fees, the non-audit services limitations 
and the obligatory rotations are measures which could be taken to protect the auditor’s 
independence even though the present controversy and the different points of view 
from the doctrine.  
i. Changes related to Auditor’s Independence 
Due to the financial crisis, the recent financial reporting and the auditing 
scandals such as Enron Case in 2002 and its “creative accounting” (Moreno, 2010), 
Gowex and its “black Tuesday” in 2014 (Martínez, 2014), the bankruptcy of Bankia 
(Navarro, 2016)  or the “problems with the debt” of Abengoa, among others (Navarro, 
2014), the user’s confidence in audit reports and financial statements is at risk, for this 
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reason, the audit activity must guarantee that this information is reliable and accurate. 
Auditor independence ensures confidence in the audit service and, therefore, it also 
ensures the confidence in financial reporting, being the audit profession a service of 
public interest. Consequently, to jeopardize auditor’s independence could also 
undermine user’s confidence in financial reports as ICAC points out (Fernández, et al., 
2013).  
Hereafter, it is explained the modifications in the new Act 22/2015 (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, 2015) which seeks to guarantee the auditor’s independence, 
according to the aspects named above, comparing with the previous consolidated text 
of the Audit of Accounts Law (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2011) 
It is important to mention that auditor’s independence is a key requirement 
directly related with audit quality, or put in another way, “the independence of auditors 
should thus be the bedrock of the audit environment” (European Commission, 2010). 
Thus, the new law tries to improve the audit activity across the regime of independence 
to which all auditors are subject.  It is remained the standard content 12/2010 (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, 2010) based on: 
- The general principle of independence, which requires an auditor to refrain 
from acting when his objectivity could be compromised in relation to the economic and 
financial information that has to be audited. 
- Incompatibilities, set of circumstances, situations or specific relationships in 
which it is considered that auditors are not independent and they should refrain from 
conducting the audit. 
The European regulation also establishes the general 
principle of being independent, having to the auditors refrained 
when there are financial, commercial, labour or others 
relationships, considering their network environment and more 
stringent requirements such as a person who could influence the 
outcome of the audit’s refrain from participating in the decision-
making process, taking measures to avoid conflicts of interest or 
business relationship or otherwise, direct or indirect, actual or 
potential, that could compromise independence, among others.  
On the basis of this Directive, it has been incorporated the new requirements in 
order to strengthen the incompatibilities system. This does not mean that the auditor's 
independence cannot be compromised by previous threats from interests or business 
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relationships, work, family or others, existing prior to the period of calculation 
established. Thus, it incorporated legally the obligation to establish systems to 
safeguard against threats that may arise from conflicts of interest or any commercial, 
labour, family or other relationship. Therefore, auditors should be and appear to be 
independent. 
It is important to remark that the new law establishes that the duty of 
independence could be affected by the existence of relationships, situations or 
services, not only between the auditee and the auditor, but also between it and the 
auditor’s network. In extension rules, it is collected that if people or entities included 
in this area incurred in any of the cases of incompatibility referred to in this Act and 
other laws, it also makes incompatible the auditor in relation to the respective entity.  
Specifically, in 2015 Act, it is defined the General Principle of independence, 
adding the fact that every person in conditions to influence directly or indirectly in the 
result of the audit they will have to abstain. The new law also remarks the prohibition of 
incur in certain incompatibilities, it maintains that the Institute of Accounting and 
Auditing is “the agency responsible for ensuring proper compliance with the duty of 
independence and to assess in each particular job possible lack of independence of an 
auditor or audit firm”. 
With respect to the identification of threats and safeguard measures, the 
new text includes some new threats factors such as those resulted from the existence 
of conflicts of interest or any commercial, financial, labour, family or other relationship, 
direct or indirect, actual or potential. It also remarks the new incompatibilities derived 
from situations that compete in relatives of the auditors, people or entities related to the 
auditor or audit firm and, finally, those who compete in people or entities belonging to 
the audit network or audited company. 
Regarding to incompatibility causes, the new audit network concept has been 
incorporated with more incompatibilities about some circumstances derived from 
personal situations and from given services. To mention some examples: the 
significant direct interest derived from a contract, the 
implementation of operations by financial 
instruments, the request or acceptance of gifts or 
favours except in the case of being a gift which has 
an insignificant value or being included in the 
services of accounting, the design of procedures 
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related to the financial information, among others, pointing the incompatibilities spread 
to the companies linked of the audited company.  
The auditor network is an important change in the new incompatibilities regime 
with several articles related. In general terms, it includes the incompatibilities derived 
from situations which contribute to relatives of the principal auditors 
responsible, including the provision of services and not only to links of consanguinity 
or affinity up to the first degree, or the second degree if it is a collateral consanguinity 
such as previous law said. According to the incompatibilities derived from 
situations that concur in people or entities directly related to the auditor or audit 
firm, it is included all the people which form part of the engagement team, employees, 
provide services or people directly involved in the audit activities and not only members 
of the audit firm or any person who participates or has the ability to influence the 
outcome of the audit. Finally, the incompatibilities derived from situations which 
contribute to other individuals or entities belonging to the network of the auditor 
or audit firm, it is added the single network of the 
main auditors responsible and not only the signatory 
auditor. Additionally, it has been specified as persons 
of the auditor or firm network those that have the 
condition of partner, administrator and the organ of 
administration or general representative in any firm 
belonging to the network.  
Hereafter it is explained the change of several interesting points that could 
influence in the guarantee of the auditor’s independence. In respect of the regime of 
contract, obligatory rotation is not established except for entities of public interest 
which have their own regime in the Title I, Chapter IV, including the independence 
regulation (3rd section), that it will be briefly explained below. About the prohibitions 
later the conclusion of the work, it is included auditors who form a part of the audit 
order team. Special is the case of fees and transparency which incorporates the 
definition of contingency fees and the reasons of abstention for perceived fees 
when auditors or their networks obtain fees derived from non-audit services which 
represent more than 30 percent of their total annual income.  
As discussed earlier in this report, Public 
Interest Companies (EIP) have their own regime in 
the new act 22/2015 that includes some additional 
restrictions. It is necessary to emphasize that 
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expansion companies with values admitted to negotiation in the alternative investment 
market (MAB) has been included in the EIP group in order to avoid news scandals 
such as Gowex fraud (Veloso, 2015). The new law restricts some questions about the 
auditor’s independence of EIP in accordance with the regulation (EU) n º 537/2014 
(European Parliament, 2014). From the analysis of both laws it can point out several 
aspects such as: the adding of incompatibilities and prohibition of the provision of 
some non-audit services (some tax services, payroll services; some legal services, 
among others); the duty of rotation, being the initial engagement for at least three 
year and the maximum duration 10 years, including renovations and the obligatory 
rotation of the principal auditors responsible for the work of audit (mandatory 
rotation); the appointment of auditors with free selection procedure and the justified 
recommendation of the audit committee; and fees shall not be contingent fees 
(calculated according to the outcome or the result of the work) and non-audit services 
shall be limited to no more than 70% of the average of paid fees, not being the fees 
received more than 15% and not being more than 15% of the total annual revenues 
from non-audit services. The picture below (Figure n.3) shows the most important 
changes in auditor’s independence, differentiating between EIP and the rest of 
companies. Logically, EIP have a more restricted regime as far as the auditor’s 
independence with details as the mandatory rotation.  
 
Figure 3: Interest changes related to the Auditor Independence 
Source: Own elaboration 
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ii. Changes in Infringements and Penalties System 
With regard to the infringements and penalties system, it should be noted that 
the previous laws introduced the major changes and the current law has only included 
some small amendments (See tables in annex). Already in 1988, the duty of auditor’s 
independence was introduced and its breach was considered as a serious infraction 
(Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1988). Nevertheless, they were considered as minor and 
the sanctions were not sufficient because very serious infractions did not exist yet. 
Gross negligence or wilful misconduct in the breach of independence did not become a 
very serious infraction up to the law 44/2002 when this new type of infractions was 
introduced (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2002). With the law 22/2015 (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 2015)new changes have been added in order to strengthen the auditors’ 
independence such as the failure of the maximum duration of the contract or the 
limitation of fees, concepts narrowly related to the audit independence because it 
reduces the negative effects that the loss of clients can have and it avoids the 
excessive familiarity between auditor and client, increasing the independence (Herrera, 
2016). 
Nonetheless, the sanctions associated with these infractions have developed in 
different senses from 1988. It should be stressed that the sanctions depend on the type 
of committed infraction and, therefore, the lack of independence will be a very serious 
infraction, depending on if there was gross negligence or wilful misconduct in the event. 
From the law 13/1992 (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1992), sanctions are not only for the 
auditor, it is applied both to the auditor and to audit firm by the same infraction. 
Whereas, the new law prescribes practically the same amounts, limits in the sanctions 
and years of suspension in the ROAC than the previous law. There was a significant 
change between the 2010 law and the previous one (law of 2002) regarding sanctions. 
In all the cases, the law of 2002 increases so much the quantity of sanction and the 
minimal and maximum limits of fines with regard to previous law of 1992. Later, this 
increase in the amount of the sanctions and limits was reduced in 2010 and it remains 
the trending with the new law (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2010).  
If the maximum fines for audit firms are analysed graphically, it can be noted 
that penalties regulation have been changing during the different laws, increasing until 
2002 and decreasing until the current law (Figure n. 4). Data are calculated with the 
amount of penalties that laws fix for serious and very serious infringements.  
The fine related to the auditor is not included because this fine is independent of 
the audit firm penalty, but the same study is possible with the auditor fines data. It was 
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observed a growing trend in 1992 and 2002 acts, but this percentage decreased in 
2010 and it remains in force with the present law.  
 
Figure 4: Maximum Fines to audit firms according to the Fees 
Source: Own elaboration 
Another example is the graphic above (Figure n.5, own elaboration with the 
information obtained from the legislation) that shows the minimum fines of serious and 
very serious infringements for the audit firms in different laws. In this graphic, it can be 
seen the hardness of the legislation in 2002 and the reduction of the penalties once 
again.  
 
Figure 5: Minimum fines for audit firms 
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In general, sanctions try to dissuade people of committing infractions in any 
area, and this also happens with the sanctioning regime in the financial audit. The 
objective of the sanctions system is not the collection of fines, but avoiding 
infringements. For this reason, sanctions have 
reduced since law 44/2002 in audit legislation by 
the criticism from the audit sector, causing 
doubts in this respect. According to Gonzalo and 
Castellanos (2010), the act 2010 has extended 
the types of infraction but it has reduced the 
amount of the sanctions and, as a consequence, 
this new system has not a deterrent effect. In 
addition, the infractions related to the independence have to include wilful intent or 
gross negligence on the part of the auditor to be qualified and sanctioned like very 
serious.  
In view of the previously mentioned, on the one hand, it can be noted that 
control of infringements could be effective but as penalties system has been relaxed, 
this control could be useless because it does not achieve its target of avoiding 
infringements and that fact is just what this report pretends to demonstrate in the case 
of Spain. On the other hand, criticism about the collection of fines as penalty system 
objective forces the decrease of the amount of penalties, searching a balance between 
the audit sector opinion and the effective legislation.   
c. Audit Market in Spain  
It is well known that the situation of the audit sector causes a great international 
interest both at national and at global level, so there are many studies in the matter. 
The present report is focused on the national area, that is to say, it analyses the 
evolution of the sector of audit in Spain. This is necessary in order to understand if the 
current legal framework is adapted to the real-life conditions. 
  In accordance with Toscano, et al. (2014), at present the named “Big Four” 
(Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC) controls the 
audit services market worldwide, operating in 
more than 150 countries, including Spain, and 
auditing more than 90 percent of the biggest 
companies. Through a process of mergers with 
another audit firms, the big audit firms reduce 
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the number of competitors because of the existence of an oligopoly situation in the 
audit market. Consequently, a small number of audit firms control a high percentage of 
the activity both at the world and at the Spain market. In the specific case of Spain, 
there is a tendency to trust in the big international audit firms by Spanish companies.  
The Journal Expansión publishes every year its annual Audit Ranking where 
shows the audit firms that have a revenue over a million Euros (Expansión.com, 2010; 
2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). Analysing this information from 2009 until 2015, 
it is possible to observe (Figure n.6) that the “Big Four” firms have not moved of their 
respective positions, even it is possible to realize this extension to the “Big Six” audit 
firms which operate in Spain. There are only some changes that can be observed in 
the first ten places. One of them is the disappearance of Confeauditores and Gassó 
RSM, giving way to Adade and Crowe Horwath. Gassó RSM returns to its position in 
the ranking in 2013 and it kept in the eighth place since then, displacing to Crowe 
Horwath to the eleventh position. In 2015, the surprise was that the PKF Attest jumped 
and now it appears in the “Top Ten”, thanks to a progressive increase of its revenues 
in the last years.  
 
Figure 6: Top Ten Audit Firms Evolution 
Source: Own elaboration  
The next image shows the top ten audit firms and their revenues in 2015, it can 
be seen graphically that the concentration of the market is only in four audit firms 
(Figure n.7, own elaboration with Expansión Journal Audit Ranking information). In this 
year, the sector has billed 2,414 million euros but, 1,845.5 million euros belong to the 
“Big Four”, which supposes 76.45% of the market revenues. Regarding to the “Top 
Ten”, these first 10 audit firms have obtained the 88.75% of the market share with 
2,142.50 million euros of turnover.  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1st Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte
2nd PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC PwC
3rd KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG KPMG
4th Ernest&Young Ernest&Young Ernest&Young Ernest&Young Ernest&Young Ernest&Young Ernest&Young
5th BDO BDO BDO BDO BDO BDO BDO
6th Grant Thornton Grant Thornton Grant Thornton Grant Thornton Grant Thornton Grant Thornton Grant Thornton
7th Confeauditores Confeauditores Confeauditores Auren Auren Auren Auren
8th Auren Auren Auren Mazars Gassó RSM Gassó RSM Gassó RSM
9th Gassó RSM Gassó RSM Gassó RSM Adade Mazars Mazars Mazars




Figure 7: Revenues (Mill. €) of the First 10 Audit Firms in 2015 
Source: Own elaboration  
3. Infringements and Penalties System: Data Review 
a. Methodology 
Once theoretical framework has been explained, it is important to analyse some 
aspects about infringements and penalties system in order to distinguish the evolution 
of infringements and penalties according to the legislation until now and the future 
evolution of them with the new legislation. It is important to remark that the study is 
based on the theory explained above which says that auditor’s independence is 
essential to improve the audit quality and the only way forward is across the ICAC 
control of infringements and the application of appropriate sanction. In this case study 
there are several limitations due to the access of the information. For this reason, it is 
analysed the information in several periods according to the pooled data obtained in 
different ICAC Activity Reports (Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas, 2010; 
2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015), several articles regarding infringements and penalties 
(Navarro & Bernad, 2004; de las Heras, et al., 2008) and other papers (Fau, 2014), 
taking into account that there are not data since 1988 until 1992. The main objective is 
the analysis of the auditor independence and showing if the new audit law improve it or 
not, bringing light the improvement points of the new law. The sanctions issued in the 
BOICAC are serious and very serious infringements. Therefore, the access to the 
sanctions corresponding to minor infringements is not possible, which it could generate 
a significant bias in the information analysed. However, the lack of independence of the 
auditor is considered a very serious or serious infringement, both on the current 
legislation and on previous. Consequently, all sanctions filed for this reason appear in 

















Firstly, it is show the trending of the sanctions since 1992 until 2014, valuing if 
the changes in audit legislation were significant. Secondly, it is analysed the cause of 
infringements and the type of infringers in the period since 1992 until 2002 pointing out 
the infringements related to independence. This period is important because it had not 
very serious infringements yet, only serious and minor 
infringements were included in the legislation until 2002. 
The same way is used to the period since 2002, when 
very serious infringements were introduced in the law, 
until 2014 in order to compare both situations. In this 
period, it can show the amount of penalties and its 
implications. Finally, it is described the time-series 
analysis about 2013 and 2014 according to the activity reports of the ICAC (Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas, 2014; 2015) with the objective of showing the 
previous situation of the auditors’ independence before the legislation changed. This 
period can confirm the reasons of the law changes in the subject of independence.  
b. Results 
In order to show the trending of the ICAC sanctions since 1992, it has been 
grouped together some date from several articles and studies cited above (Figure n.8). 
The ICAC activity was insignificant in the early years, peaking in 2001 until this 
moment, previously the reform of several aspects in the audit law in 2002. After that, 
return to decrease until 2004. From that moment, the trending is unstable but it has an 
important rise of the ICAC sanctioning activity. In 2007, when the financial crisis starts, 
the number of the sanctions was 59, the second year with more sanctions in the history 
of the ICAC. In 2010, when the second Spanish audit law was approved, the number of 
sanctions was at its lowest level since 2000. The maximum number of sanctions arises 
in 2013 with 60. The increase of the number of sanctions could be because two 
reasons: by an increase of the control or by an increase of the infringements. In this 
case, it has not data to analyse this point but, in poppers sections it will go into this with 
greater depth. It is curious how a decrease of the 
number of penalties exists in the same year or 
previously those reforms happen, nevertheless, data do 
not show a specific trending or a particular situation is 
related. It is point out the increase of sanction activity in 
the last few years, probably because of the increase of 




Figure 8: Sanctions trending since 1992 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration 
i. Infringements and Penalties Research of 1992-2002 Period 
Hereafter, it is analysed the specific period since 1992 until 2002 which very 
serious infringements were not established in the current legislation yet. In this decade, 
the number of the sanctions was a total of 180, being in the majority of the cases for 
individual auditors (61.1%), as show Figure n.9). In this moment, audit legislation was 
very recent in Spain but not for the rest of Europe where big audit firms already 
operated, including in the Spanish market.  
 
Figure 9: Number of sanctions classified by type of Infringers (1992-2002) 
Source: own elaboration 
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Infringements caused by audit firms were a minority (70 penalties that supposes 
a 38.89%) but, it was sanctioned in a vast majority of the cases both audit firm and the 
main auditor (77.14%), being sanctioned only the audit firm in the 8.89% of the total 
infringements.  
Apart from that, Figure n.10 shows the most important infringements commit in 
this period which the lack of auditor’s independences is the second cause of sanction 
after breach of standards (19 infringements that supposes a 10.6%). That fact reveals 
the importance of the auditors’ independence and its control from part of the ICAC, in 
spite of the difficulty that exists in its demonstration.  
 
Figure 10: Causes of the infringements since 1992 until 2002 
Source: own elaboration 
Thus, the breach of standards was the 85% of the infringements because it is 
an easily detectable violation. It is important to remark that lack of independence could 
damage de quality of the audit report and, in addition, it could decrease the confidence 
of the users of financial information.  
ii. Infringements and Penalties Research of 2003-2014 Period  
Down below, it is study the infringements and penalties system situation since 
2003 until 2014. In order to maintain the uniformity of the data, it is impossible to 
include 2015 because ICAC activity report has been not published yet. Remember that 
in 2002 reform it was stablished the difference between serious and very serious 
infringements. In the case of auditor’s independence, the lack of independence could 
be considered as serious or very serious, depends if it is an infringements with gross 
negligence or wilful misconduct or not. 
Hereafter, the Figure n.11 shows the penalties applied in the period under 
consideration, being 2.6 times more than the previous period, although there is only 
one additional year. It is an important data because demonstrate that the control and 
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disciplinary activity of the ICAC is increasing. Apart from that, this decade is very 
important for the scandals around audit sector since Enron in 2002. This fact could be 
another reason for that growth, concurring with the start of the financial crisis.  With a 
total of 469 penalties, almost the 68% of the infringements were provoked by audit 
firms and their auditors (317), being only the 32.4% caused by individual auditors 
(152). If this situation is compared with the same analysis in the previous period, it is 
observed a change on its. While the most sanctioned infringers were the individual 
auditors in the past decade, in the current period are more penalised the audit firms, 
probably because of the concentration of the sector in the big audit firms. It is a 
question of statics that the more companies are audited by audit firms, the more 
probability of sanction these audit societies. 
 
Figure 11: Number of sanctions by type of infringers since 2003 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration 
It is important to highlight that audit firm was penalised in solitaire around the 
48% of the total penalties (a 71.29% of the audit firms sanctions) against of the 20% of 
sanctions imposed to the auditors (28.7% of the audit firms penalties) but, in this case, 
audit firm is also sanctioned because when ICAC penalise the main auditor pertaining 
to an audit firm, audit firm is automatically sanctioned too.   
As well as the previous period, it is important to study how the important is the 
position of lack of independence infringements. As show Figure n.12, the lack of 
independence continuous the second cause of infringements in the analysed period 
(2003-2014). It is indicative than a worry from part of the ICAC for this kind of 
infringements, on top of the breach of standards the first position. That fact confirms 
the importance of the independence such as the preservation of the financial 




Figure 12: Main causes of infringements since 2003 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration 
Another kind of infringements are to block ICAC control and not providing the 
requested information (10.1%), to failure to conduct a contracted audit (2.37%), to work 
without ROAC registration (5.34%), among others.  
According to Figure n.13, a vast majority of infringements collected in the 
BOICAC are serious infringements (93.4%), with only the 6.6% are considered very 
serious infringements with gross negligence or wilful misconduct.  
 
Figure 13: Type of infringements since 2003 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration 
That effect is just because the default has to be very important to be considered 
very serious. It is the proof of the ICAC control does not only search the collection of 
fines but to avoid the infringements. Furthermore, if the sanction has not the 
appropriate amount, it will be not sufficient to reduce the infringements in lack of 
independence. In Figure n.14 the majority of sanctions are between €6.000 up to 
€12.000. It is obvious that audit firms such as Deloitte that turned over $34.000 million 




Figure 14: Amount of penalties since 2003 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration 
Only 6 exceeded half a million Euros in eleven years, so it seems the hardness 
of the 2002 reform has not influenced excessively in this regard and, in addition, this 
fact verify the previous theory that very serious infringements are minimum. The Figure 
n.15 shows graphically the impact of the amount of sanctions, being only the 3% of 
them more than €15.000, that it corroborates the lack of dissuasive power linked to the 
penalties.  
 
Figure 15: The portion of amounts of penalties since 2003 until 2014 
Source: own elaboration from several articles cited above. 
Comparing both periods, a change of the audit market can be observed in 
favour of the audit firms and the legislation should reflect that situation in order to avoid 
the lack of independence from part of the auditors who operate in a very concentrate 
market, putting their independence at risk and individual auditors in danger of 
disappearing. In addition, ICAC control has increased substantially a cause of the 
growth of audited companies, its disciplinary activity and the financial crisis which 
provoked a rise of falsehood in the financial statements of some companies in order to 
avoid the financial crisis impact and the auditors not being able to prevent this situation.  
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iii. Infringements and Penalties time-series analysis 2013-
2014 
It is important to analyse the previous situation before the change of the audit 
law in order to visualise the causes of the necessity of a new audit act. First of all, it 
can see the situation of the audit sector, having into account the sector is formed by 
individual auditors and audit firms. In the Figure n.16 it can distinguish that individual 
auditors are about the double than audit firms in 2013, but nearly 90% of audit 
revenues are invoiced by ten audit firms, fact that supposes that only the 10% of 
revenues are for 2700 individual auditors and the rest of audit firms (around 1390 
approximately) as described above in the sector study.  
 
Figure 16: Sector situation in 2013 and 2014 
Source: own elaboration from ICAC Activity Memories of 2013 and 2014. 
These data confirm the high level of concentration of the audit market and the 
necessity of redistribute the audit contract in order to avoid the concentration of the 
field across the obligatory rotation of the auditor, especially in Public Interest Entities 
(EIP). Comparing both years, the trending is the decrease of individual auditors and the 
maintaining of the quantity of audit firms. A large number of individual auditors cannot 
survive in a market with a high level of competence and tend to disappear.  
As far as the ICAC control in the studied years, the investigation and inspection 
or direct action has been increasing in 2014 but not as regard supervision or indirect 
action (Figure n.17). That supposed that ICAC activity is focused in direct actions, that 
is to say it is the proper ICAC activity in quality control, transparency, technical control 
and independence protection against the supervision of the inspections realized by the 
auditors' corporations, consequently the ICAC is more concerned by the exercise of its 
control and disciplinary activity than the corporation supervision. This fact is also a 
symptom of confidence in the auditors’ corporations control activity such as 




Figure 17: Direct and Indirect actions 
Source: own elaboration from ICAC Activity Memories of 2013 and 2014. 
In spite of the large control activity of the ICAC, only a handful of proceedings 
are sanctioned. However, the expedients sanctioned do not tend to rise, as the 
investigations and inspections. Only 60 expedients in 2013 and 52 in 2014 were 
sanctioned as shows Figure n.18. 
 
Figure 18: Sanctions proceedings 
Source: own elaboration from ICAC Activity Memories of 2013 and 2014. 
The proportion of sanctions is minimum respect the volume of the activity audit 
sector and the volume of the ICAC activity control. This could be due to a less degree 
of infringement by the auditors or the ICAC incapacity to control every audit contract.  
Regarding the causes of infringements, there are several different aspects that 
preclude their comparison. In 2013 the first cause of infringements are the breach of 
the duty of rotation, followed by the breach of technical auditing standards, while the 
third cause is the lack of independence, concretely with gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct (Figure n.19). The lack of rotation is one of the several aspects that they 
affect to the auditor’s independence; consequently, the lack of independence is now 







Figure 19: Cause of infringements in 
2013 
Source: own elaboration from ICAC 





However, the first cause was the breach of the duty of publish the annual 
transparency report or the duty of provide information in 2014. The second and third 
causes are the same that the previous year, fact that shows the objective of the ICAC 




Figure 20: Cause of 
infringements in 2014 
Source: own elaboration from 





It is important to point out the importance of the control of independences 
across the infringements and penalties system with the objective of improving the 
quality of the audit activity and the confidence on the financial information, especially in 
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Investigated Infringements in 2014
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iv. A Case study according the three dimensions analysed: 
Pescanova data in non-audit services, rotation and fees.  
In 1960 Jose Fernandez Lopez founds Pescanova, revolutionizing the history of 
the fishing world industry with its initiative to construct fishing vessels which it could 
process and freeze the fish on board. In the middle of the 60s there was born the brand 
Pescanova and it incorporates products of the sea and other varieties as precooked, 
vegetables, pizzas, and so on in 70s, being the reference brand in frozen products. In 
the decade of 80 Pescanova it is consolidated as a corporate group based on the 
vertical integration, controlling the whole process, from the origin, through the 
transformation up to the commercialization and it expands to Europe its commercial 
activity (Pescanova.es, 2016)It is not a new company such as Let’s Gowex, Pescanova 
is a firm with a long background in its sector, trading on the Spanish Stock Exchange 
since June of 1998 and it is controlled by the CNMV since this moment (cnmv.es, 
2016). Its financial states are public information and it is considered a Public Interest 
Entity (EIP).  
Hereafter, it is exposed all the information according to the three dimensions 
named above in order to demonstrate if the Pescanova auditors were independents or 
not. Remember that the auditor independence could be considered through fees, 
rotation and non-audit services, among other questions but that are considered the 
most important for the analysis under study.  
Firstly, BDO, the current audit firm of Pescanova in the period of the scandal, 
collect more than 2.37 million euros of fees from Pescanova Group between 2009 and 
2014 (Efeagro.com, 2014), entering Pescanova into an insolvency procedure in March 
of 2013 (Elpais.com, 2013). 
Secondly, the auditor of Pescanova group was the firm BDO during twelve 
consecutive years, fact that supposes the 63.3% of the total live of the company 
(cnmv.es, 2016). BDO is an international audit company that occupies the fifth place in 
the audit firms ranking with more than thirty years of experience in the audit market 
(bdo.es, 2016).  
Finally, the Figure n.21 shows the degree of non-audit services between 2009 
and 2015 for the audit firm from Pescanova. There are data only since 2003 but 
previous years the non-audit services were not made by BDO, the firm that audited the 
annual financial statements in this period. In addition, Ernest&Young was the 
Pescanova audit firm in 2014 and 2015, for this reason, the interesting period is since 
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2009 until 2013 in order to demonstrate the independence of BDO. The most important 
year in portion of non-audit fees was 2010 with 30.5%, but never BDO deliver services 
that suppose more than 50% of total non-audit fees (cnmv.es, 2016). The problem in 
that analysis is that there is not the perfect level of non-audit services and the law do 
not clarify this point.  
 
Figure 21: Degree of non-audit fees from Pescanova 
Source: own elaboration 
BDO was sanctioned for the breach of technical auditing standards and failure 
of information, not for lack of independence. This study reinforces the decision of the 
ICAC who do not sanctioned BDO for a lack of independence in attendance of the 
three aspects mentioned above (Abc.es, 2014).  
Once analysed the infringements and penalties during the selected period in 
accordance with the theoretical framework, several questions may be answer.  
It is essential pointing out the importance of the auditor’s independence in the 
audit activity in order to reinforce the confidence and the quality of the auditor work. In 
addition, the only way to control and to ensure the auditor’s independence is across the 
investigations of the responsible organism, the ICAC in this case.  
Looking at the situation of the infringements and sanctions since 1992 in Spain, 
there is not a solid trending in sanctions a cause of the different laws and the change of 
the ICAC direction. Nonetheless, it has always been so much interest in the 
preservation of the auditor’s independence because its importance in the audit activity. 
The lack of independence is one of the most important failures pursued for the 
legislation and, consequently, for the ICAC, however, it is very difficult to demonstrate 
this lack of independence for the reason that what is a threat to the independence for 
some, it is not always for others. In addition, the sanctions in the studied period are not 
a high level of amount and that fact could not be enough for avoiding infringements.   










The activity of the audit sector is concentrated in a few audit firms, but it is 
necessary to deconcentrate the field in order to open the market, when the quantity of 
individual auditors is decreasing.  
4. Conclusion  
The audit in Spain is a public interest activity whose regulation has been 
recently amended by Audit Act-22/2015 with the objective to adapt the Spanish 
legislative framework to European standards and to stem the current situation of loss of 
confidence in the financial information, especially by improving those aspects that 
guarantee the auditor’s independence. Once again, it is highlighted the importance of 
auditor’s independence in the quality of audit activity and its close relationship with the 
improvement of the user’s confidence in audited information. This paper makes an 
exhaustive analysis of the audit legislation, taking into account the current situation of 
the sector, which has proven its excessive concentration and the necessity of its 
openness, fact that the legislation collects as one of their motivations. In view of the 
introduced objective of this paper, analysing the leading role of the infringements and 
penalties system in auditor’s independence, the current situation of the control and 
disciplinary activity implemented by the ICAC has been carefully considered, in order to 
demonstrate if this activity is effective in ensuring independence. The above mentioned 
studies allow concluding the following: 
Firstly, one of the most relevant aspects on audit regulation is auditor’s 
independence, a controversial issue in the literature but a key point because it has a 
critical role in the credibility of financial information. This controversy gets worse when 
the difficulty of proving the auditor’s independence is also kept in mind. Because of 
that, audit regulation should consider all aspects that prove and fence the 
independence. This is a difficult task because there are many variables which affect the 
independence, but this report particularly noted out three crucial aspects for auditor 
independence: a) the cases of incompatibilities, including the limitation of non-audit 
services; b) the mandatory rotation, and c) the limitation of fees. It has been showed 
that, if the legislation regulates these aspects at an appropriate level, auditor 
independence will be guaranteed and, therefore, the trust of users on the financial 
information will increase significantly. However, the new act has been widely criticized 
by the industry and several public institutions. Such a thing might suggest that it is less 
restrictive in this regard than it should be; although if it is compared to the previous act, 




Secondly, in relation to the infringements and penalties system, the legislation 
has not strengthen the type of offenses or increased the amount of fines in order to 
avoid the belief that the punishment system has the main goal of collecting money. The 
problem is that sanctions are ineffective to prevent independence violations in a very 
concentrated sector. Fines are now very low for a few companies with a high level of 
income but are very high for most of the audit sector with much lower levels of income. 
A vast majority of audits are executed by the named big 4 international audit firms  
whereas small independent auditors suffer the consequences of paying high fines even 
accepting the risk of disappear in some cases. It would be necessary in this regard a 
legislation which distinguishes different amount of sanctions depending on the degree 
of net income level and not only being decided by the level of fees.  
Finally, after analysing the disciplinary and control ICAC activity in order to 
determine whether it prevents cases of infringements regarding auditor independence 
and it enables to improve it, it can be concluded that it is very difficult to guarantee the 
independence of auditors due to the difficulty to prove it. It is true that the lack of 
independence is one of the most sanctioned violations and, therefore, one of the most 
pursued by the ICAC. However, it is necessary to execute more and better control tools 
within a saturated market. The way to achieve this is by strengthening the 
infringements and penalties system and by giving the ICAC and other organizations the 
necessary tools to ensure a proper tracking and monitoring of audit activity. The 
disclosure of the transparency report has enabled to improve so much in this sense, 
but auditors are not exempt from fraudulent activities which should be prosecuted and 
punished by the ICAC, especially those concerning auditor independence, so they 
should adopt a more sceptical attitude. In order to anticipate any possible imbalance in 
the future, it should be a requirement to carry out continuous follow-ups and some 
constant inspections.   
In short, it is essential to adapt the legislation to improve audit quality and 
credibility in financial information, especially in the independence of the auditor. One 
way could be to establish a proper control as well as an efficient system with well-
defined infringements and appropriate sanctions. The current law has substantially 
improved those aspects which help to ensure auditor’s independence, especially in the 
field of EIP, but there is still a long way to go. In addition, audit sector should help to 
achieve this objective by collaborating in the appropriate alignment of the legislation 
and by giving an example of independence, improving the prestige of the audit activity 
and the quality of financial information that is essential for the proper functioning of the 
market. The question now is if the new law is effective enough to avoid the lack of 
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independence in spite of the criticism for its hardness. According with this paper, it 
could be solved with the monitoring of infringements and sanctions when the law 
comes into force.  If lawmakers dare to found the suitable fence to all the aspects that 
concern the auditor’s independence and they implement the appropriate measures in 
order to control and punish their infringement, the auditor’s independence will be 
guaranteed in the majority of cases and thus, the financial information will be 
trustworthy information. However, further studies are needed to clarify these points. 
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6. Annex   
 
Figure 22: Changes in audit legislation 











Figure 23: Infringements and Penalties System 
Source: own elaboration 
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